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Note
DICKEY v. STATE: JURY INSTRUCTION ON DRUG USE AND ITS
CONCOMITANT EFFECT ON EYEWITNESS CREDIBILITY
RACHEL M. WITRIOL
State,1

In Dickey v.
the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a trial court is obliged to give a requested jury instruction on the
credibility of testimony given by a witness who is addicted to drugs or was
abusing drugs at the time of the alleged crime.2 The Court of Appeals held
that the subject matter of the requested instruction had already been
addressed by other instructions given to the jury, and that the requested
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law because it called for
examination of addict-witness testimony under a heightened standard of
scrutiny.3 The court‘s holding resulted from its misapplication of the threepart test based on Maryland Rule 4-325, under which a trial court must
consider several factors in assessing whether it must give a requested
instruction to the jury.4 The court also neglected to address the specific
facts of the Dickey case in its analysis of addict-informant instructions.5
Although the court properly affirmed Dickey‘s conviction, its holding left
an unclear rule that appears to give trial courts broad discretion to deny
requests for addict-witness instructions when in fact certain circumstances
should require a trial judge to instruct the jury on a witness‘s relationship
with drugs and the effect of drug use on credibility.6

Copyright © 2009 by Rachel M. Witriol.
Rachel M. Witriol is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland School of
Law where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. She is greatly appreciative to
Emily Chase Dubansky, Notes and Comments Editor, and to Heather R. Pruger, Executive Notes
and Comments Editor, for their support, guidance, and encouragement throughout the writing
process. The author would also like to thank Professor Abraham Dash for the wisdom and insight
he imparted from his experience in the field of criminal law.
1. 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (2008).
2. Id. at 196, 946 A.2d at 449.
3. Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
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I. THE CASE
Petitioner Desmond Ellison Dickey was charged with first degree
murder and other related felonies in connection with a fatal shooting that
occurred on August 12, 2001, in Baltimore, Maryland.7 Anthony Carlest
was killed in the shooting and Carlest‘s cousin, Melvin McCallister, was
wounded.8 Four eyewitnesses, including McCallister, identified Dickey as
the shooter.9 Dickey was subsequently charged in the Circuit Court of
Maryland for Baltimore City.10
During Dickey‘s trial, eyewitness Earl Price admitted to having a
history of drug abuse, that he was currently addicted to heroin, and that he
occasionally used cocaine.11 He also stated that he had used heroin on the
day of the shooting, but asserted that the drug use did not affect his ability
to perceive and recall the events to which he testified.12 Price further
testified that police told him they would drop the drug possession charges
stemming from his arrest on October 4, 2001, in exchange for his testimony
at Dickey‘s trial.13
After the conclusion of the evidence, Dickey requested a jury
instruction stating that the testimony of a witness who either used drugs or
was addicted to drugs ―must be examined with greater scrutiny than the
testimony of any other witness.‖14 The circuit court denied the request,
reasoning that the issue had already been dealt with during Price‘s crossexamination regarding his drug abuse problems and his ability to remember
the events, as well as by other jury instructions given regarding witness
credibility and accuracy of witnesses‘ recollection.15 The jury later

7. Dickey, 404 Md. at 189, 195, 946 A.2d at 445, 449.
8. Id. at 189, 946 A.2d at 445. The shooting was apparently the result of a dispute between
McCallister and Dickey‘s cousin, Juan Tucker. Id., 946 A.2d at 446.
9. Id. at 189–91, 946 A.2d at 446. McCallister identified Dickey as the shooter out of a
police line-up. Id. at 190, 946 A.2d at 446. Anna Boxer also identified Dickey as the shooter, and
testified that he was the driver of the white Caravan involved in the shooting. Id. William
McLain witnessed the shooting and wrote down the license plate number of the van in which he
saw the shooter leave the scene, which was registered to Dickey. Id. at 190–91, 946 A.2d at 446.
Earl Price, a long-time acquaintance of Tucker and Dickey, testified that Dickey was the shooter,
and that after the shooting ended he saw Dickey and Tucker get into a white car together. Id. at
191, 946 A.2d at 446–47.
10. Id. at 189, 946 A.2d at 445.
11. Id. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 193, 946 A.2d at 447. This jury instruction is derived from the Modern Federal Jury
Instructions. Id. at 193 n.2, 946 A.2d at 447 n.2 (citing 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN
FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 7-91 (2006)).
15. Id. at 193–94, 946 A.2d at 448.
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returned a verdict of guilty on all counts and Dickey was sentenced to life
plus thirty years imprisonment.16
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed Dickey‘s
conviction.17 The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court erred by
refusing to give the requested instruction.18 The court reasoned that Price‘s
testimony regarding his drug use and addiction entitled Dickey to a
specialized instruction as a matter of law.19 However, the Court of Special
Appeals found the error was harmless due to the abundance of other
evidence connecting Dickey to the shooting, as well as the jury‘s
knowledge of Price‘s drug use and addiction from his testimony on direct
and cross-examination.20 Thus, the court affirmed Dickey‘s conviction.21
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether
the circuit court erred by denying Dickey‘s request for a jury instruction
requiring heightened scrutiny of drug-addict witness testimony and, if so,
whether such an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.22
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Maryland Rule 4-325 governs whether a trial court is required to give
a requested jury instruction in a criminal trial.23 The Maryland Court of
Appeals has devised a three-part test interpreting Rule 4-325.24 The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the only Maryland appellate court to
have addressed jury instructions on drug-addict witness testimony prior to
Dickey, requires a trial judge to grant a request for a specific jury instruction
addressing a witness‘s relationship with drugs and its effect on that
witness‘s testimony.25 Maryland law is more settled on what jury
instruction a trial court must give in the case of testimony by accomplice
witnesses or witnesses promised a benefit for testifying: The Maryland
Court of Appeals requires a trial court to instruct jurors tasked with
determining the credibility of such witnesses to consider their testimony
―with caution.‖26

16. Id. at 195, 946 A.2d at 449.
17. Dickey v. State, No. 1184, slip op. at 32 (Md. App. Feb. 21, 2007).
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 12, 15.
21. Id. at 32. The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the circuit court after
vacating Dickey‘s sentence for unrelated reasons. Id. at 27.
22. Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 196, 946 A.2d 444, 449 (2008).
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Based on Maryland Rule 4-325, the Court has Devised a ThreePart Test for Determining Whether a Trial Judge is Required to
Give a Requested Instruction
Maryland Rule 4-325 governs whether a trial judge must give a
requested jury instruction during a criminal trial.27 Specifically, Maryland
Rule 4-325(c) states: ―The court may, and at the request of any party shall,
instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the
instructions are binding . . . . The court need not grant a requested
instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.‖28
The Maryland Court of Appeals has interpreted this rule to require the court
to give an instruction when it meets three pre-conditions: (1) it is a correct
statement of the law, (2) it is applicable to the facts of the case, and (3) it is
not covered by other jury instructions.29
The court has long asserted the principle that a trial judge is not
required to give a requested instruction as long as other instructions given
to the jury ―‗fairly cover‘ the subject matter of the requested instruction.‖30
In Gunning v. State,31 the court granted certiorari in two cases, both
involving a defendant convicted based on a single eyewitness‘s
uncorroborated identification.32 In both cases, the defense was mistaken
identification, and both defendants requested a jury instruction on
eyewitness identification, which the trial judge refused to give to the jury.33
The court emphasized that a trial judge has discretion when deciding
whether to give a requested instruction, but that failure to exercise such
discretion is considered error.34 In each case, the court found the trial judge
failed to exercise his discretion by denying the requested instruction based
on an incorrect assumption that identification instructions are per se
inappropriate.35 The court explained that a trial judge properly exercises
judicial discretion by making an individualized determination—based on
the facts and evidence—of whether the requested instruction is necessary,
and whether other instructions ―fairly cover‖ the subject matter of the
requested instruction.36
27. MD. R. 4-325.
28. Id. 4-325(c).
29. See infra notes 30–49 and accompanying text.
30. Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 348, 701 A.2d 374, 382 (1997); Grandison v. State, 341
Md. 175, 211, 670 A.2d 398, 415 (1995); England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 276, 334 A.2d 98, 105
(1975).
31. 347 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374.
32. Id. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 345, 348, 352, 701 A.2d at 380, 383–84.
35. Id. at 351, 701 A.2d at 383.
36. Id. at 353, 701 A.2d at 384.
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This inquiry is articulated in both Patterson v. State37 and Thompson
v. State.38 In both cases, the Court of Appeals noted that it has consistently
interpreted Maryland Rule 4-325(c) to oblige a trial judge to give a party‘s
requested instruction where the instruction is ―(1) a correct statement of the
law; (2) applicable under the facts of the case;‖ and where ―(3) the content
of the requested instruction [is] not fairly covered elsewhere‖ in the
instructions actually given to the jury.39 In Patterson, the defendant was
convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute based on
evidence that cocaine was found inside a jacket located in the trunk of his
car.40 The defendant‘s defense at trial was that the jacket did not belong to
him.41 The prosecution entered only a picture of the jacket into evidence at
trial because law enforcement had lost the jacket.42 The defendant
requested a ―missing evidence‖ instruction at trial, stating that the jury
could infer that the prosecution did not offer the jacket into evidence
because the jacket was exculpatory.43 The court found the trial judge was
not required to give the instruction, in part because there was no evidence
that law enforcement intentionally destroyed the jacket or that the jacket
was exculpatory.44
In Thompson, the defendant was convicted of assault, reckless
endangerment, and several firearms offenses.45 Evidence adduced at trial
showed that the defendant attempted to flee on his bicycle when he was
approached by a detective.46 The trial court granted the State‘s request for
a flight instruction over defense counsel‘s objection.47 The Court of
Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by giving the flight
instruction because the facts showed that the defendant did not flee from the
detective due to a guilty conscience relating to the crimes he was charged
with at trial.48 In both Patterson and Thompson, the court acknowledged

37. 356 Md. 677, 683–84, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999).
38. 393 Md. 291, 302–03, 901 A.2d 208, 214 (2006).
39. Thompson, 393 Md. at 302–03, 901 A.2d at 214; Patterson, 356 Md. at 683–84, 741 A.2d
at 1122 (citing Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 58, 702 A.2d 699, 718 (1997)); see also MD. R. 4-325.
40. Patterson, 356 Md. at 680–81, 741 A.2d at 1120–21.
41. Id. at 682, 741 A.2d at 1121.
42. Id. at 681–82, 741 A.2d at 1121.
43. Id. at 682, 741 A.2d at 1121.
44. Id. at 697–99, 741 A.2d at 1129–30.
45. Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 300, 901 A.2d 208, 213 (2006).
46. Id. at 295, 901 A.2d at 210.
47. Id. at 298–300, 901 A.2d at 212–13.
48. Id. at 313–15, 901 A.2d at 221–22. In fact, the defendant admitted to police that he fled
from the detective because he had drugs in his possession. Id. at 313, 901 A.2d at 221. The
defendant was not being tried for drug possession, so this fact was not admitted into evidence at
trial. Id. at 314, 901 A.2d at 221. The court found that the defendant may have been prejudiced
by the flight instruction, and thus the trial judge abused his discretion. Id. at 315, 901 A.2d at 222.
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the importance of the three-prong test in the trial court‘s determination of
whether to give the requested instruction.49
At the same time, the Court of Appeals has also consistently asserted a
rule that is seemingly incompatible with the three-prong test.50 In General
v. State,51 the Court of Appeals reiterated the rule that ―[w]hether a
particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any
evidence in the case that supports the instruction.‖52 This rule is often
incompatible with the three-prong test because it presents a different
standard for whether a trial judge must give a requested instruction. In
General, the defendant was charged with and convicted of a hit and run.53
At trial, his defense was that he believed he struck a trash bag, not a
person.54 He requested a specific jury instruction regarding the defense of
mistake of fact, but the trial court denied the request, giving only
knowledge and proof of intent instructions to the jury.55 The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that ―[t]he knowledge and intent instructions,
while sufficiently informing the jury of the required mental element, did not
expressly direct the jury‘s attention to the defense of mistake of fact.‖56
The court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to the instruction
because there was evidence that he believed he struck a bag, not a person.57
Thus, under this alternative rule articulated in General, if there is some
evidence that generates a requested instruction, the trial court is required to
give that instruction.58 In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to
generate an instruction under this rule, the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the defendant.59 This rule is seemingly incompatible with
the three-prong test, under which a trial judge is not required to give a

49. Thompson, 393 Md. at 302, 901 A.2d at 214; Patterson, 356 Md. at 683–84, 741 A.2d at
1122.
50. See, e.g., General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 486–87, 789 A.2d 102, 108–09 (2002)
(―Whether a particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any evidence in
the case that supports the instruction.‖); Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 582, 583 A.2d 1037, 1041
(1991) (―[A] defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense that is fairly
supported by the evidence.‖); Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 97, 145 A.2d 428, 433 (1958) (―It is
incumbent upon the court . . . when requested in a criminal case, to give an advisory instruction on
every essential question or point of law supported by the evidence.‖).
51. 367 Md. 475, 789 A.2d 102.
52. Id. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09.
53. Id. at 478–79, 789 A.2d at 104.
54. Id. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106.
55. Id. at 480–81, 789 A.2d at 105. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that there
was no error because the requested instruction was ―fairly covered‖ by the general intent
instruction given to the jury. Id. at 482–83, 789 A.2d at 106.
56. Id. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
57. Id. at 488, 490, 789 A.2d at 109, 111.
58. Id. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09.
59. Id. at 487, 789 A.2d at 109.
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requested instruction if other instructions cover the subject matter of the
requested instruction.60
B. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals Requires a Trial Court to
Give a Drug-Addict Witness Instruction on Credibility, While
Federal Courts Sometimes Require Addict-Informant Instructions
In Allen v. State,61 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals first
examined the issue of whether a trial judge is required to give a specific
jury instruction related to drug-addict witness testimony.62 Defendant
William Allen, a dentist, was convicted of solicitation to commit murder for
soliciting an undercover police officer to murder a Deputy State‘s
Attorney.63 Allen apparently held a grudge against Deputy State‘s Attorney
Barry Levine after Levine brought charges against him for drug related
offenses, to which Allen later pled guilty.64 At trial, Allen‘s friend, Larry
Westwood, testified that Allen confided in him that he wanted to kill
Levine.65 Westwood admitted during his testimony that he abused drugs,
including valium and triazolam (a drug used to treat insomnia), and used
cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana.66 Allen requested a jury instruction
regarding Westwood‘s drug use, but the trial court denied the request.67
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial court must
give an instruction on drug use and addiction when evidence of a witness‘s
drug addiction or drug abuse is ―abundant.‖68 The Court of Special
Appeals reasoned that the trial court‘s general instructions on witness
credibility did not cover the specific circumstances surrounding the
testimony of such a witness.69 The Allen court found that the trial court
committed error by not giving the requested instruction regarding drug use
and its ―concomitant effect on [witness] credibility.‖70 The Court of
Special Appeals, however, ultimately held that the trial court‘s error was
harmless due to the combination of the jury‘s awareness of the witness‘s
drug abuse and addiction that came out during his testimony and the general

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
91 Md. App. 705, 605 A.2d 960 (1992).
Id. at 709, 605 A.2d at 962.
Id. at 707–08, 605 A.2d at 961.
Id. at 709–11, 605 A.2d at 962–63.
Id. at 712–13, 605 A.2d at 963–64.
Id. at 711 n.4, 605 A.2d at 963 n.4.
Id. at 739, 605 A.2d at 977.
Id. at 742, 744, 605 A.2d at 978–79.
Id.
Id. at 742, 745, 605 A.2d at 978, 979.
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instruction the jury received on witness credibility.71 The Maryland Court
of Appeals denied certiorari.72
Maryland courts often look to the federal courts when Maryland case
law provides little direction on a particular issue. While most federal courts
have not directly addressed drug-addict witness instructions, many have
dealt with a similar issue: the addict-informant instruction.73 Federal circuit
courts are split on whether it constitutes error to refuse to give an addictinformant instruction.74
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in United States v. Kinnard75 and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Griffin76 both held that a
trial court‘s refusal to give an addict-informant instruction may constitute
error depending on the circumstances.77 In Kinnard, defendants Darnell
Kinnard and Mahlon Payne were both convicted of drug possession, failure
to pay taxes, and sale of heroin for their involvement in a drug transaction
arranged by a government informant who was a known drug user.78 The
D.C. Circuit reversed and held that when such a witness testifies, the trial
court must instruct the jury to consider the testimony with ―extreme
caution‖ if it is uncorroborated in any material way, because addictinformants have a motive to fabricate the truth.79
In Griffin, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully receiving and
concealing narcotic drugs, and buying and selling narcotic drugs.80 The
government‘s informant for the case was an admitted drug addict, but the
trial court failed to give an addict-informant instruction.81 The Sixth
Circuit reversed the conviction and held that Griffin had a right to have the
jury instructed to carefully evaluate the addict-informant‘s credibility.82

71. Id. at 745, 605 A.2d at 979.
72. Allen v. State, 327 Md. 625, 612 A.2d 256 (1992).
73. 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL ¶
7.01[3], at 7-55, 7-56 (2008).
74. Id.
75. 465 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
76. 382 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1967).
77. Kinnard, 465 F.2d at 569 (holding that an addict-informant instruction is required if
requested); Griffin, 382 F.2d at 829 (holding that an instruction is required if an addict-informant
witness‘s testimony is the only evidence connecting the defendant to the crime). In subsequent
Sixth Circuit cases in which a drug-addicted witness was not also an informant, the Sixth Circuit
held that a drug-addict instruction is not required per se. United States v. Warner, 955 F.2d 441,
455 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 946 F.2d 1191, 1194–95 (6th Cir. 1991).
78. Kinnard, 465 F.2d at 568.
79. Id. at 572.
80. Griffin, 382 F.2d at 824.
81. Id. at 828–29.
82. Id. at 829.
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However, these cases are more the exception than the rule. The
majority of federal courts have found no reversible error for a trial court‘s
refusal to give an addict-informant instruction because reliability issues are
sufficiently highlighted during witness testimony, by other instructions
given to the jury, or both.83 Among these is the Seventh Circuit, which
84
held in United States v. Rodgers that it was not error to deny an addictinformant instruction where the defendant‘s main concern was the witness‘s
―ability to perceive and relate the truth‖ rather than the risk that the addictinformant witness would lie on the stand.85
C. Maryland Courts Have Long Treated with Apprehension the
Testimony of Accomplice Witnesses and Witnesses Promised a
Benefit for Testifying
For nearly 100 years, Maryland courts have recognized the necessity
of a specific jury instruction advising jurors to consider ―with caution‖ the
testimony of accomplice witnesses and witnesses promised a benefit for
testifying. In 1911, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Luery v. State86
that testimony of an accomplice witness is ―universally received with
caution‖ and should be ―weighed and scrutinized with great care.‖87 The
defendant in Luery, a junk dealer, was convicted of receiving stolen

83. See United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 549–50 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the trial
court did not err by denying an addict-informant instruction where the concern was witness
perception, not risk of perjury). See also Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 882–83 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the trial court did not err by rejecting addict-informant instruction where no evidence
of the witness‘s addiction was introduced during trial); United States v. Bryan, 122 F.3d 90, 92
(2d Cir. 1997) (finding that a refusal to give an addict-informant instruction did not prejudice the
defendant‘s substantial rights); United States v. Vgeri, 51 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
that an addict-informant instruction was not required absent evidence that the witness used drugs
during the events testified to, and because the informant was cross-examined regarding his drug
use and the jury received other relevant instructions); United States v. Yarbough, 55 F.3d 280,
283–85 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an addictinformant instruction); United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1577–79 (11th Cir. 1988)
(finding that the trial court did not err by failing to give an addict-informant instruction when the
court provided ample jury instructions on the informant‘s credibility); United States v. Williams,
809 F.2d 75, 87 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no per se rule for giving addict-informant
instructions); United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 658, 660–61 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court‘s refusal to give an addict-informant instruction);
United States v. Hoppe, 645 F.2d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the trial court did not err
by refusing to provide an instruction where informant‘s drug-addiction was disputed); United
States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1261–63 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that the trial court did not err
by denying a request for an addict instruction); Gov‘t of Virgin Islands v. Hendricks, 476 F.2d
776, 779–80 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that the trial court did not err by not giving an instruction
regarding the reliability of an addict-informant).
84. 755 F.2d 533.
85. Id. at 549–50.
86. 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 (1911).
87. Id. at 292, 81 A. at 684.

http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Witriol.pdf

2009]

DICKEY v. STATE

113

goods.88 An employee of the United Railways & Electric Company of
Baltimore admitted to stealing the goods from his employer, pled guilty to
larceny, and testified as an accomplice against the defendant.89 While the
court affirmed the defendant‘s conviction, it did so by formulating the rule
that a conviction based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony
should be disallowed.90
Brown v. State91 reaffirmed the rule first established in Luery requiring
corroboration of accomplice testimony to sustain a conviction.92 In Brown,
the defendant was convicted of second degree murder based on
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice witness.93 Even though an
instruction cautioning the jury to examine accomplice witness testimony
―with care and [to] view[] [it] with suspicion‖ was not at issue in Brown,
the Maryland Court of Appeals nonetheless recognized that such an
instruction accomplished a similar purpose to that of the Luery rule.94 The
court affirmed the conviction on the basis that the ―accomplice‘s testimony
was adequately corroborated.‖95
The Court of Appeals again affirmed in 2004 use of the ―with caution‖
standard in Archer v. State.96 The defendant in Archer was convicted of
felony murder and attempted murder.97 A witness to the murder pled guilty
for his involvement in the crime and testified at trial on the State‘s behalf in
exchange for leniency.98 On appeal, the Court of Appeals approved of the
trial court‘s specific instruction to the jury regarding a witness who was
promised a benefit in exchange for his testimony.99 The instruction stated
that such testimony ―should [be] consider[ed] . . . with caution.‖100
Therefore, the Court of Appeals has consistently recognized that the
testimony of accomplice witnesses or witnesses who are promised a benefit
for their testimony should be treated with apprehension.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 285, 81 A. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 292–95, 81 A. at 684–85.
281 Md. 241, 378 A.2d 1104 (1977).
Id. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108.
Id. at 241–42, 378 A.2d at 1105.
Id. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108.
Id.
383 Md. 329, 859 A.2d 210 (2004).
Id. at 335, 859 A.2d at 214.
Id. at 371–72 n.4, 859 A.2d at 235–36 n.4.
Id.
Id.
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III. THE COURT‘S REASONING
In Dickey v. State,101 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed
Desmond Ellison Dickey‘s conviction and held that the trial court did not
err by refusing to give the defendant‘s requested jury instruction regarding
the credibility of drug-using or drug-addicted witnesses.102 In doing so, the
court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but gave different
justifications than the Court of Special Appeals for its affirmation.103 In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the three-prong test originating
from Maryland Rule 4-325, which governs criminal jury instructions.104 In
applying the test, the court found that the trial court was not required to give
the requested instruction because it did not meet two of the three
conditions.105 While it noted that the requested instruction was applicable
to the facts of the case, the court found that the instruction did not correctly
state the law and other jury instructions ―fairly covered‖ the issue.106
The court reasoned that an instruction that the jury should scrutinize a
drug-abusing or drug-addicted witness‘s testimony ―with more caution‖
than other witnesses and ―with greater scrutiny‖ was not a correct statement
of Maryland law.107 The court pointed out that the scrutiny standard for
instructions regarding testimony of a witness who has a motive to lie is
―merely ‗with caution,‘‖ and does not require an elevated standard of
scrutiny.108 According to the court, there was no case law to support
Dickey‘s assertion that the testimony of a drug-abusing or drug-addicted
witness required more scrutiny than that of a witness who is promised a
benefit in exchange for testimony, or of a witness with any kind of

101. Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (2008).
102. Id. at 189, 946 A.2d at 445.
103. Id. While the Court of Special Appeals found that the trial court committed error by not
giving the specific instruction, it affirmed the conviction because it found the error was harmless.
Id. at 189 n.1, 946 A.2d at 445 n.1. The Court of Appeals did not find that the trial court erred at
all. Id.
104. Id. at 197–98, 946 A.2d at 450; see also MD. R. 4-325. The test requires that a trial court
give a requested instruction when three conditions are met: ―(1) the instruction is a correct
statement of the law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of
the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.‖ Dickey, 404 Md.
at 197–98, 946 A.2d at 450 (citing Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 302–03, 901 A.2d 208, 214
(2006); Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 683–84, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999)).
105. Dickey, 404 Md. at 199, 946 A.2d at 451.
106. Id. at 199 & n.6, 946 A.2d at 451 & n.6.
107. Id. at 200, 946 A.2d at 452.
108. Id.
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problematic perception issues.109 As a result, the court concluded that the
requested instruction was an incorrect statement of law.110
The court also found that the requested instruction was already
covered by other instructions given to the jury.111 The court reasoned that
precedent dictated careful consideration of a defendant‘s request for a jury
instruction regarding eyewitness testimony unless other instructions given
similarly guided the jury.112 Under this standard, whether other instructions
sufficed was a question for the trial court and, as long as the judge
considered whether the requested instruction had already been sufficiently
addressed, it was not error for the judge to deny the request.113 Here, the
court found that the trial judge appropriately exercised his discretion in
deciding not to give the requested instruction.114
The court further agreed with the trial court that the instructions given
regarding the credibility of witnesses115 and the identification of the
defendant116 sufficiently covered the issue of a drug-addicted or drugabusing witness‘s ability to perceive and recall events.117 The court found
that these instructions, in addition to Price‘s testimony and Dickey‘s ability
to raise the issue of Price‘s drug use and addiction during closing
arguments, gave the jury ―ample guidance . . . to make credibility
assessments.‖118 Thus, the court found that the issues raised in Dickey‘s
requested jury instruction were ―fairly covered‖ by other instructions given
by the trial court.119 In so finding, the court concluded that two of the three
conditions of the three-prong test were not met, and therefore the trial court
was not required to give the requested instruction.120

109. Id.
110. Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452. The court emphasized that the trial court was not required to
give the instruction at all, and that if it had given the instruction, the trial court itself may have
committed error. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 201–02, 946 A.2d at 452–53 (citing Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 354–55, 701
A.2d 374, 385 (1997)). The court further noted that eyewitness identification instructions were
not required per se. Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452.
113. Id. at 202 & n.7, 946 A.2d at 453 & n.7.
114. Id. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454.
115. The instruction used is found in Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:10. Id. at
202, 946 A.2d at 453.
116. The instruction used is found in Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:30. Id.
117. Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452.
118. Id. at 203, 946 A.2d at 453–54.
119. Id. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454.
120. Id. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Dickey v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland improperly
affirmed the trial court‘s denial of Dickey‘s request for a special jury
instruction on drug-addicted and drug-abusing witnesses.121 In doing so the
court misapplied Maryland‘s established three-prong test to hold that the
requested instruction was fairly covered by other instructions given and that
it was an incorrect statement of law.122 When applying the three-prong test,
the court should have instead substituted its own ―with caution‖ standard in
the requested instruction, rather than rejecting the instruction altogether.123
The court should also have discussed the significance of Earl Price‘s status
as a drug-addict and as a witness promised a benefit for testifying in its
analysis of addict-informant instructions.124 Finally, the court should have
explicitly approved use of a specific instruction regarding drug-addict
witness testimony that incorporates the ―with caution‖ standard, particularly
where such a witness is the sole eyewitness to an alleged crime with little
corroborating evidence.125
A. The Court Misapplied the Three-Prong Test
The court failed to correctly apply Maryland‘s three-prong test in two
ways. First, in holding that the trial court‘s general jury instructions ―fairly
covered‖ the subject matter of the requested instruction, the court did not
consider the special circumstances that drug-addict witness testimony
presents.126 Second, the court should have substituted the ―with caution‖
standard to modify the proposed instruction so that it would have met the
court‘s three-part test.127
The trial court‘s general jury instructions in Dickey did not ―fairly
cover‖ the subject matter of the requested instruction regarding drug-addict

121. See infra Part IV.A–C.
122. See infra Part IV.A.
123. See infra Part IV.A.
124. See infra Part IV.B.
125. See infra Part IV.C.
126. See Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 705, 742, 605 A.2d 960, 978, cert. denied, 327 Md. 625,
612 A.2d 256 (1992) (noting that drug-addict witness testimony presents the specific issue, not
covered by a general witness credibility instruction, of the ―concomitant effect‖ that a witness‘s
relationship with drugs has on his credibility).
127. See Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 207, 946 A.2d 444, 456 (2008) (―[H]ad counsel
submitted a properly worded instruction advising the jury that if the jury found that Price was
addicted to drugs and had been using drugs during the relevant time in question, the jury should
consider Price‘s testimony with care and caution, it would have been within the court‘s discretion
to give the instruction and would not have been error.‖). See also infra notes 135–136 and
accompanying text.
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witness testimony.128 General witness credibility issues raised in Maryland
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 3:10, 3:13, and 3:30, the source of the
instructions given by the trial court, do not encourage a jury to consider
such matters as the ―concomitant effect‖ drugs have on a witness‘s
credibility.129 Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals in Allen found that a
general jury instruction given regarding witness credibility did not address
the particular circumstance of the witness‘s ―relationship with drugs and the
concomitant effect on his credibility as a witness.‖130 Similarly in Dickey,
Earl Price‘s relationship with drugs likely affected his credibility as a
witness to the shooting.131 Even the court in Dickey recognized that the
rationale behind a specific drug-addict instruction is to alert the jury that
drug abuse may have had ―perceptual effects‖ on a witness‘s capacity to
accurately observe and relay what occurred.132 In doing so, the court itself
acknowledged the difference between the subject matter of general jury
instructions on witness credibility and a ―witness using or addicted to
drugs‖133 instruction. While they are somewhat similar, the two subjects
are distinct enough to warrant a specialized jury instruction.134
128. Cf. General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 490, 789 A.2d 102, 111 (2002) (holding that general
knowledge and intent instructions did not fairly cover a requested instruction on the mistake of
fact defense that was generated by evidence). Compare Allen, 91 Md. App. at 742, 605 A.2d at
978 (holding that the trial court erred by failing to give a specific instruction regarding a State‘s
witness‘s status as a drug abuser), with England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 276, 334 A.2d 98, 105
(1975) (holding that the trial court was not required to give a general instruction regarding
identification because it was fairly covered by instructions given on burden of proof and weighing
of evidence). See also Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 3–10, Dickey,
404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (No. 23) (arguing that other instructions given did not specifically
address the witness‘s ability to perceive and relate the events and that the enumerated factors of
the instructions given misled the jury away from considering Price‘s drug use and its effect on his
testimony).
129. Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions §§ 3:10, 3:13, 3:30 (2007).
130. Allen, 91 Md. App. at 742, 605 A.2d at 978.
131. See id. (finding the witness‘s relationship with drugs had a ―concomitant effect on his
credibility as a witness‖). See also Bernie R. Burrus & Harry L. Marks, Testimonial Reliability of
Drug Addicts, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 259 (1960) (―[E]ven the temporary presence of drugs
affects the functioning of the body‘s organs, and thus bears directly on the credibility of the
witness‘ testimony.‖); 28A C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 408 (2008) (―[T]he addiction of the
addict must be considered as having an important bearing on his or her credibility.‖); 81 AM. JUR.
2D Witnesses § 840 (2008) (stating that drug use affects ―the ability of the witness to perceive,
recall, or relate . . . the event about which he is testifying if under drug influence at that time‖).
132. Dickey, 404 Md. at 205, 946 A.2d at 454.
133. Id. at 203, 946 A.2d at 454 (―The purpose of the ‗Witness Using or Addicted to Drugs‘
instruction is to direct the jury‘s attention to the potential perceptual effects drug use or addiction
might have on a witness‘s ability to observe and relate events in the witness‘s testimony . . . .‖).
134. See, e.g., 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CRIMINAL ¶ 7-91 (2008). See also Allen, 91 Md. App. at 742, 605 A.2d at 978 (finding that a
general witness credibility instruction did not adequately address a witness‘s ―relationship with
drugs and the concomitant effect on his credibility as a witness‖). The comments to the Modern
Federal Jury Instructions discuss the distinction between the general witness credibility instruction
and the addict instruction: ―[T]he rationale for the addict instruction is different from [other
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Second, instead of flatly rejecting the requested jury instruction, the
court should have substituted its own ―with caution‖ standard in the
requested instruction to allow the instruction to meet the court‘s three-prong
test. The court correctly asserted that a ―heightened standard of scrutiny‖ is
an incorrect statement of Maryland law.135 As the court acknowledged,
however, the trial court may substitute its own language to correct a jury
instruction that erroneously states the law.136 Therefore, after the court
determined that the ―heightened standard of scrutiny‖ was an incorrect
statement of Maryland law, it should have used its own ―with caution‖
standard when conducting the requisite three-part analysis under Maryland
Rule 4-325.137 By reworking the requested instruction into a correct
statement of law,138 the court would have corrected the instruction‘s
statement of the law to enable the trial court to fulfill its obligation to

instructions that] . . . go to the credibility of the witness, addiction itself relates primarily to the
ability of the witness to perceive and relate observed events. It does not necessarily reflect on the
truthfulness of the witness.‖ Id. Dickey also makes this point in his reply brief, stating that ―the
language of the [credibility] instruction, however broad it may be, cannot be read to cover
perceptual impairment as a result of drug use or addiction.‖ Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and
Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 6, Dickey, 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (No. 23).
135. Dickey, 404 Md. at 200–01, 946 A.2d at 452. See also Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329,
371–72 n.4, 859 A.2d 210, 235–36 n.4 (2004) (approving the court‘s use of the ―with caution‖
standard for instructing the jury on testimony of a witness promised a benefit); Brown v. State,
281 Md. 241, 246, 378 A.2d 1104, 1106–07 (1977) (stating that Maryland has traditionally used
the ―with caution‖ standard for accomplice testimony instructions); Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284,
292, 81 A. 681, 684 (1911) (―[T]he evidence of an accomplice is universally received with caution
and weighed and scrutinized with great care.‖). The court bolstered its argument that a ―with
caution‖ standard is more appropriate than the ―heightened standard of scrutiny‖ by citing to
criminal pattern jury instructions from Mississippi, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, without
acknowledging that the requested instruction in Dickey came directly from a federal pattern jury
instruction. Dickey, 404 Md. at 193 n.2, 200–01, 946 A.2d at 447 n.2, 452.
136. Dickey, 404 Md. at 198 n.5, 946 A.2d at 450 n.5 (―[W]here a requested instruction is
technically erroneous, but the subject is one in which the court is required to give an instruction, it
is the duty of the trial court to include a correct instruction.‖ (citing Noel v. State, 202 Md. 247,
252, 96 A.2d 7, 10 (1953); Gooch v. State, 34 Md. App. 331, 337, 367 A.2d 90, 94 (1976))).
137. See Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 350, 701 A.2d 374, 382–83 (1997) (―[A] trial judge is
under no obligation to use the precise language suggested by counsel in submitting an
instruction . . . [the trial court] is not preclude[d] . . . from fashioning its own instruction, provided
that the judicially-crafted instruction is accurate and ‗fairly covers‘ the requested instruction.‖);
see also Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 12, Dickey, 404 Md. 187, 946
A.2d 444 (No. 23) (―[I]f the court in the present case objected to the ‗greater scrutiny‘ language in
the requested instruction, it easily could have removed that language or substituted it with . . . a
sentence directing the jury to examine the testimony of a witness who uses or is addicted to drugs
‗with caution.‘‖). Instead of properly making the focal issue of its opinion a specific instruction
regarding drug-addict/user witness testimony, the court focused on the over-arching language of
the instruction put forth by Dickey. Dickey, 404 Md. at 200, 946 A.2d at 452.
138. See Dickey, 404 Md. at 200–01, 946 A.2d at 452 (disapproving of the heightened standard
of scrutiny in the requested instruction and finding it was an incorrect statement of law).
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instruct the jury on the issue of Price‘s drug addiction because there was
sufficient evidence to support the requested instruction.139
B. The Court Failed to Recognize the Particular Applicability of its
Addict-Informant Analysis to the Facts of Dickey
The Dickey court explained in its opinion that issues involving the
testimony of witnesses who are addicted to or using drugs most often arise
in the context of witnesses who are both addicts and informants.140 In its
analysis, the court failed to discuss the pertinent facts surrounding Dickey‘s
trial—mainly that Price was similarly situated as a witness.141 Though not
an informant, Price was nevertheless promised a benefit for testifying.142
An analysis of these facts may have led the court to find that a special
instruction on drug addiction was particularly applicable in situations like
this one, where a witness is not only an accomplice, informant, or has been
promised a benefit for testifying, but is a drug-addict or was using drugs at
the time he witnessed the alleged crime.
The court itself understood the need for an instruction in such
circumstances. In fact, the court cited the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in
United States v. Rodgers that addict-informant instructions stem from ―the
concern that ‗addict-informants are subject to powerful temptations that
create a serious risk that they will lie on the stand.‘‖143 However, the court
did not address the fact that Price was offered a deal that may have tempted
him to lie on the stand.144 Although Price‘s status as a witness who was

139. Cf. General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 486–87, 789 A.2d 102, 108–09 (2002) (―Whether a
particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any evidence in the case that
supports the instruction.‖).
140. Dickey, 404 Md. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454.
141. See id. at 192, 204–05, 946 A.2d at 447, 454 (―Price admitted that he was a heroin addict,
an occasional cocaine user . . . that he had a long history of drug use . . . that he had used heroin
on the day of the shooting . . . [and] that he was testifying at Dickey‘s trial as part of a deal to
avoid charges following an arrest . . . .‖).
142. Id. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447. Price was offered a deal in which the state would drop
charges related to his arrest for possession of controlled dangerous substances in exchange for his
testimony against Dickey. Id.
143. Id. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 549 (7th Cir.
1985)). See also Evan Haglund, Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405,
1412–13 (1990) (arguing that informants have a proclivity to lie); Alexander Penelas, Note,
Illinois v. Gates: Will Aguilar and Spinelli Rest in Peace?, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 875, 899 (1984)
(―Informants are frequently themselves criminals, drug addicts, or liars who give information for
reasons other than the call of civic duty.‖); Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors
Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1383 (1996) (―Criminals are likely to say
and do almost anything to get . . . out of trouble with the law. This willingness to do anything
includes . . . committing perjury. A drug addict can sell out his mother to get a deal.‖).
144. Dickey, 404 Md. at 192, 201, 946 A.2d at 447, 452 (noting that ―Price stated repeatedly on
the record that he was testifying at Dickey‘s trial as part of a deal to avoid charges,‖ but not
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promised a benefit for testifying was not directly an issue on appeal, the
court ignored an important fact by failing to incorporate the underlying
facts of the case into its analysis.
The court‘s failure to address the facts underlying Price‘s testimony is
evidenced by its approval of the Rodgers view of drug addict or user jury
instructions.145 The Rodgers court concluded that there was no error in
refusing to give such an instruction because it ―reflected a concern with the
witness‘s ability to perceive and relate the truth, not with a deliberate
misstatement because of the desire to please the government.‖146 However
in Dickey, due to Price‘s deal with the prosecutor, he may also have
misrepresented his testimony as a result of his ―desire to please the
government.‖147 Thus, had the court correctly acknowledged that Price was
both an addict and a witness promised a benefit, its analysis could have
more appropriately required the requested instruction in this case.
C. The Court Appears to Give Broad Discretion to Trial Courts When,
Under Maryland Law, Certain Circumstances Require a Trial
Judge to Give a Requested Instruction on Drug-Addict Witness
Testimony
The Court of Appeals affirmed Dickey‘s conviction because the trial
court‘s failure to give the requested instruction did not constitute error.148
While the court did not reach its second question, whether an error to refuse
to give the requested instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt,149 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals properly found that the
failure to give the instruction in Dickey was harmless.150 The abundance of
other evidence, aside from Price‘s identification of Dickey as the shooter,
was indeed sufficient to support the jury‘s verdict.151 However, the Dickey
court did not clearly instruct lower courts about how to apply its
decision.152 The court stated that it did not approve of the ―heightened
discussing this fact in its analysis because ―the requested jury instruction [at issue] d[id] not deal
with a motivation to lie‖).
145. Id. at 206, 946 A.2d at 455.
146. Id. (quoting Rodgers, 755 F.2d at 549).
147. Id. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447. See also supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.
148. Dickey, 404 Md. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456.
149. Id. at 196, 946 A.2d at 449.
150. Id. at 189 n.1, 946 A.2d at 445 n.1.
151. Id. at 189–91, 946 A.2d at 446–47.
152. Id. at 199–207, 946 A.2d at 451–56. The court discussed at length why the ―heightened
standard of scrutiny‖ in the requested instruction was an incorrect statement of the law and may
have constituted error had the instruction been given. Id. at 199–201, 946 A.2d at 451–53. It was
only at the very end of the opinion, however, that the court briefly stated that if the requested
instruction substituted the correct legal standard the instruction would have fallen within the trial
court‘s discretion to give and would not have constituted error. Id. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456.
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standard of scrutiny‖ language in the requested instruction, and that an
instruction utilizing a ―with caution‖ standard would have been
acceptable.153 However, the court left it within the discretion of the trial
court whether to give such an instruction to the jury.154
The court should have more explicitly refused to completely overrule
prior case law that had approved instructions on drug-addict witness
credibility so long as those instructions incorporated the court‘s ―with care
and caution‖ language.155 Rather, the court‘s opinion implies that any
instructions on drug use or addiction are unnecessary and should not be
used.156 The court‘s analysis, particularly when viewed together with
Maryland precedent, creates ambiguity at the trial court level.
The court further failed to consider that an instruction on drug use or
addiction may be required under some circumstances, and cannot always be
left within the discretion of the trial court.157 The court neglected to discuss
the alternate rule that, in Maryland, a requested instruction is necessary if
there is ―some evidence‖ to support it, and such evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the accused.158 In Dickey, evidence regarding
Price‘s drug use at the time he witnessed the shooting and his struggle with
drug addiction during the time of his testimony at Dickey‘s trial adequately
generated the requested instruction because such evidence supports
Dickey‘s claim that Price‘s testimony might not have been credible.159
Given the court‘s misapplication of the three-part test under Maryland Rule
4-325, coupled with the evidence supporting Price‘s drug-addiction and use,
the court should have recognized that a drug-addict witness instruction was
necessary in this situation.160
The court‘s failure to discuss the pertinent General rule has negative
implications for future defendants. Based on the Dickey court‘s opinion, a
trial judge faced with a case involving the sole eyewitness to an alleged
crime—a far more likely scenario than having four eyewitnesses—where

153. Id. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 110.
157. See, e.g., General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 486–87, 789 A.2d 102, 108–09 (2002)
(reasoning that a requested instruction must be given where there is ―any evidence in the case that
supports the instruction,‖ and that the trial court is required to give a requested instruction when it
is ―generated by the evidence‖); see also Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at
3 n.1, Dickey, 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (No. 23).
158. General, 367 Md. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09.
159. Dickey, 404 Md. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447; General, 367 Md. at 487 n.8, 789 A.2d at 109
n.8 (quoting Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216–17, 571 A.2d 1251, 1257 (1990)) (discussing the
―some evidence‖ requirement for generating an instruction).
160. General, 367 Md. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09. See also supra notes 126–127, 133–
134 and accompanying text.
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there is also at least some evidence of the witness‘s drug addiction or use,
may find that he is not required to give an instruction on that witness‘s
relationship with drugs and its effect on credibility. 161 However, the
General rule may require an instruction in such circumstances, particularly
if there is insufficient corroborating evidence and a refusal to give an
instruction would not result in harmless error.162 Nevertheless, the Dickey
court‘s failure to explicitly approve a drug-addict or drug-user instruction
substituting ―with care and caution‖ language may result in lower courts
improperly finding that such an instruction is per se an incorrect statement
of the law and cannot be given.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Maryland Court of Appeals appropriately affirmed Dickey‘s
conviction because the denial of the requested instruction was harmless
error in the instant case,163 the court failed to provide clear direction to
lower courts regarding the use of specific instructions addressing testimony
of drug-addict witnesses.164 The court misapplied two of the three prongs
of the Maryland Rule 4-325 test by failing to acknowledge that general
witness credibility instructions do not adequately cover the subject matter
raised in the requested instruction and by not substituting the ―with caution‖
standard in the requested instruction to conduct its analysis.165 The court
further failed to incorporate the facts of Dickey into its addict-informant
analysis by not recognizing Price‘s dual status as a drug-addict and a
witness promised a benefit for testifying.166
Although the court reached the proper result, it failed to adequately
instruct lower courts on the extent of a trial judge‘s discretion over giving a
drug-addict witness jury instruction, including where there is sufficient
evidence that a witness was under the influence of drugs.167 The court‘s
holding has particularly negative implications for lower courts in cases
involving the testimony of a drug-addict eyewitness to an alleged crime
161. Cf. Dickey, 404 Md. at 192, 207, 946 A.2d at 447, 456 (holding the trial court did not err
by denying the requested drug-addict instruction even where there was evidence of Price‘s drug
use). In Dickey, there was corroborating evidence from three other eyewitnesses. Id. at 189–91,
946 A.2d at 446. However, in the heat of a trial, a judge may not be able to discern this
distinction. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 241–42, 378 A.2d 1104, 1108 (1977)
(affirming the trial court‘s jury conviction of a defendant for murder based on uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice witness, contrary to the Luery rule disallowing such convictions).
162. See Dickey, 404 Md. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456; see also General, 367 Md. at 487, 789 A.2d
at 109.
163. Dickey, 404 Md. at 196, 946 A.2d at 449.
164. See supra Part IV.C.
165. See supra Part IV.A.
166. See supra Part IV.B.
167. See supra Part IV.C.
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where there is little evidence corroborating the testimony. Due to the
court‘s holding in Dickey, a trial court faced with these circumstances may
improperly deny a jury instruction on drug-addict witness credibility when
it really matters. The court should have taken a more effective approach by
clearly upholding the propriety of drug-addict witness instructions while
recognizing that the failure to give such an instruction in this case was
harmless error.168

168. See supra Part IV.C.

